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The New Vertical Merger Guidelines: Muddying the Waters  
 
Michael A. Salinger* 





Abstract:  The new Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Vertical Merger Guidelines 
focus attention on how vertical mergers are likely to affect static pricing incentives. In contrast, the 
section on vertical mergers in the Department of Justice’s 1984 Merger Guidelines, which the new 
Guidelines replace, place more emphasis on potential competition as a rationale for blocking vertical 
mergers. Even allowing for the possibility of raising rivals’ costs (which the successive monopoly model 
ignores), economic theory predicts that vertical mergers can provide incentives to lower all prices. 
Because of RRC, price increases are another possible consequence of a vertical merger, but which of the 
possible outcomes occurs depends on details that are likely to be difficult to measure. Potential 
competition between firms remains a more compelling rationale for blocking vertical mergers.  
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The new United States Vertical Merger Guidelines1 (VMG) supersede the section on non-
horizontal mergers in the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) 1984 Merger Guidelines,2 the last merger 
guidelines issued by one of the U.S. antitrust agencies that addressed non-horizontal mergers.3 When 
the DOJ issued those guidelines, the dominant economic theories about vertical mergers were the single 
monopoly profit theorem4 and the Cournot/Spengler models of complementary and successive 
monopoly.5 The former laid out conditions under which vertical mergers are competitively neutral. In 
the latter, a complementary products/vertical merger results in the reduction of prices to consumers 
through the elimination of double marginalization (EDM).6 A universally-acknowledged exception to the 
single monopoly profit theorem is the avoidance of rate regulation, and that theory was the basis for the 
Reagan-era DOJ decision to force the break-up of AT&T. 
A major deficiency in the economic theory of vertical mergers as of 1984 was that it ignored a 
primary reason to be concerned that vertical mergers might be anticompetitive. Steven Salop and David 
Scheffman provided the key insight. They coined the term and provided a model that captured the 
incentive to “raise rivals’ costs” (“RRC”).7 The successive monopoly cannot capture that phenomenon 
 
1 See Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission (2020). 
2 See Department of Justice (1984). 
3 The section on vertical mergers in the 1984 Merger Guidelines first appeared in the 1982 Merger Guidelines, 
which substantially revised the 1968 Merger Guidelines. See Department of Justice (1968, 1982, 1984).  
4 The single monopoly profit theorem states that a monopolist at one stage cannot increase its profits by 
integrating into an adjacent perfectly competitive stage. When the monopolist is upstream, the theorem requires 
the assumption of fixed proportions in production downstream. Who deserves credit for first deriving this principle 
remains unclear. It was part of an oral tradition associated with Aaron Director at the University of Chicago. See 
McGee and Bassett (1976). For an early exposition, see Bowman (1957). 
5 See Cournot (1870) and Spengler (1950). As is of course well-known, Cournot first published the result in French 
in 1838. The reference here is to the English translation. 
6 A series of articles that relaxed the assumption of fixed proportions underlying the single monopoly profit 
theorem appeared in the 1970’s, but those theories did not have much impact on policy toward vertical mergers. 
See Vernon and Graham (1971), Schmalensee (1973), Warren-Boulton (1974), Mallela and Nahata (1980), and 
Westfield (1981).  
7 See Salop and Scheffman (1983, 1987). 
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because, with monopoly at both stages, there are no rivals whose costs might be raised. The so-called 
“post-Chicago” literature on vertical mergers that arose starting in the late 1980’s demonstrated the 
theoretical possibility of anticompetitive vertical mergers based on static pricing incentives.8 In those 
models, RRC is the mechanism that creates the potential for anticompetitive harm. 
In 2007, the European Commission issued non-horizontal merger guidelines.9 As input into those 
guidelines, it commissioned a working paper by Jeffrey Church to review the literature on the economic 
theory of the competitive effects of vertical mergers.10 The Church working paper contained an 
extensive review of the post-Chicago literature on vertical mergers and suggested policy implications. 
The EC Guidelines clearly reflect the influence of the Church Report. Until 2020, the US Agencies had not 
seen fit to issue new non-horizontal merger guidelines. Their failure to do so did not reflect ignorance of 
the economics literature on vertical mergers. A more likely explanation is that Agency officials and staff 
were not convinced that the post-Chicago literature provided a basis for practical policy guidance.11 
Given that the 1984 Merger Guidelines preceded the post-Chicago literature, a new set of 
vertical merger guidelines might seem long overdue. Before jumping to that conclusion, however, it is 
worth considering what the section on non-horizontal mergers in the 1984 Merger Guidelines said. 
Reflecting the Chicago school influence, they did state that non-horizontal mergers are “less likely than 
horizontal mergers to create competitive problems,” but added “they are not invariably innocuous.”12 
They then laid out the principal theories the DOJ might use to support a challenge to a vertical merger. 
Avoidance of rate regulation was one of those theories, but it was not the only one or even the one 
given the most prominence. Rather, most of the section is devoted to concerns about entry. First, they 
 
8 See, for example, Krattenmaker and Salop (1986), Salinger (1988), Hart and Tirole (1990), Ordover, Saloner, and 
Salop (1990), Salinger (1991), and Riordan (1998) For reviews, see Church (2004, 2008).  
9 See European Commission (2008). 
10 See Church (2004).  
11 See Hoffman (2018). 
12 See Department of Justice (1984), §4.0. 
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point out that large firms at one stage may be likely entrants (and act as a competitive constraint even if 
they are merely perceived as likely entrants) into an adjacent stage. They say that a vertical merger 
might raise entry barriers by foreclosing entry at a single stage. They also raise the possibility that 
vertical integration might facilitate collusion based on the theory that detecting deviations from 
collusive agreements is easier with respect to final goods than with respect to intermediate goods.13  
The biggest difference between the VMG and the section on non-horizontal mergers in the 1984 
Merger Guidelines is the emphasis the VMG place on how the static pricing incentives created by a 
vertical merger can be to raise rivals’ costs and, in turn, prices to consumers. The VMG stress that the 
Agencies’ review of horizontal mergers resembles in important respects their review of horizontal 
mergers. The Horizontal Merger Guidelines14 focus primarily on how the Agencies analyze how a 
horizontal merger is likely to affect static pricing incentives. The key question to ask in assessing 
whether the VMG signal an improvement in policy is whether the analysis of static pricing incentives 
should be as central to vertical merger enforcement as it is to horizontal merger enforcement.  
Echoing the 1984 merger guidelines, the VMG state, “While the agencies more often encounter 
problematic horizontal mergers than problematic vertical mergers, vertical mergers are not invariably 
 
13 Intuitively, it might seem that vertical integration can facilitate collusion on the price of an intermediate input 
sold to unintegrated downstream firms. The 1982 and 1984 Merger Guidelines and the VMG all cite facilitating 
collusion as a possible rationale for blocking a vertical merger. But this intuition is harder to formalize than is 
generally supposed. In the standard approach to modeling collusive agreements, each participant must be given a 
production quota such that its potential gains from violating the quota are less than the present value of the profit 
reductions when the other colluders detect the violation and collusion breaks down. (See Green and Porter 
(1984)). When a vertically integrated upstream firm abides by its production quota, the appropriate internal 
transfer price for the intermediate input is the market price, not marginal cost (since using a unit of its quota 
internally reduces what it can sell externally). Thus, vertically integrated firms do not have an inherent cost 
advantage in sales of the final good relative to unintegrated downstream firms. When collusion breaks down, the 
reduction in the price of the intermediate input benefits downstream firms. Integration by an intermediate good 
producer into the downstream stage then has the effect of reducing the reduction in profits it experiences if 
collusion breaks down, thus making collusion harder to sustain. Nocke and White do present a model of how a 
vertical merger facilitates collusion, but their model relies on a quite literal interpretation of the statistical problem 
that colluding firms solve in concluding that collusion has broken down. See Nocke and White (2007).    
14 See Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission (2010). 
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innocuous.”15 If, as this statement seems to imply, challenges to vertical mergers are going to be rare 
compared with challenges to horizontal mergers, a natural question to ask is what distinguishes the 
small number of mergers that the Agencies are likely to challenge from the others? A clear answer to 
this question is necessary for the VMG to accomplish the stated goal of “assist[ing] the business 
community and antitrust practitioners by increasing the transparency of the analytic process underlying 
the Agencies’ enforcement decisions.”16  
Horizontal merger enforcement rests on what John Sutton termed “robust theory.”17 In 
analyzing horizontal mergers and making their cases in court, the Agencies use a variety of models 
tailored to the specifics of a case. While the details of the models affect the quantitative predictions, 
they share the common element of the prisoner’s dilemma nature of decisions about what price to 
charge and how much to produce in oligopolistic markets. The standard oligopoly models taught in any 
undergraduate industrial economics course (and, for that matter, intermediate and even introductory 
microeconomics courses) capture the logic underlying horizontal merger enforcement.  
The same is not true of vertical mergers. To understand this point, it is useful – indeed crucial – 
to consider the simplest possible models in which RRC and EDM can both occur. Since the Bertrand 
model with differentiated products has emerged as the primary theoretical underpinning for horizontal 
merger enforcement, the natural extension to evaluate vertical mergers is to allow for Bertrand 
competition with differentiated products at one stage and some form of market power – perhaps 
monopoly – at the adjacent stage.18  
If one is to assume duopoly at one stage and monopoly at the other, the monopoly stage can be 
“upstream,” “downstream,” or complementary. The difference in the models concerns the timing of 
 
15 Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission (2020), 2.  
16 Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission (2020), 1. 
17 See Sutton (1991). 
18 Another obvious model to consider is successive/complementary Cournot oligopoly. See Salinger (1988, 1989).  
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decisions.19 In a model of an upstream monopolist selling a necessary input to two competing 
downstream firms, the monopolist selects its price first in the pricing game and the duopolists 
simultaneously set their prices second. In a model of competing manufacturers or service providers 
(such as a video programming service) selling through a monopoly multi-product distributor, the 
duopolists move first in the pricing game. If the stages are modeled as complementary, then all the firms 
choose the price(s) of their respective stage simultaneously.20 In this article, I focus on the second of the 
these cases.21 As I show in a companion paper,22 the results from the first and the third are similar.23  
II. A SIMPLE MODEL WITH BOTH EDM AND RRC 
As noted above, two upstream firms produce differentiated products that they sell to a 
downstream firm, which then sells (or distributes) to the final consumers.  
Let demand be given by: 24 
 
19 See Salinger (1989). 
20 If consumers buy complementary products from firms at both stages, then the price of a stage is literally a price. 
However, even if “upstream” firms sell to “downstream” firms that then sell to final consumers, the downstream 
stage can be modeled as being complementary. If so, the price of the stage is the downstream margin, not the 
price of the final good.   
21 This case is simpler because it is not necessary to model the upstream stage explicitly to get the qualitative 
results. All that one needs to assume is that the upstream equilibrium entails positive margins. The analysis then 
becomes equivalent to the analysis of comparative statics for a multi-product monopolist.   
22 See Salinger (2021). 
23 Key features of the results also arise in a model of successive Cournot oligopoly. In that model, even though a 
vertical merger results in complete foreclosure, meaning that it does not sell any intermediate input to 
downstream firms, the equilibrium price of the input rises in some cases but falls in others. In other words, RRC 
can be but is not always the result of a vertical merger. See Salinger (1988).  
24 For analysis of this model for general demand curves, see Salinger (1991). An underlying assumption is that firms 
set prices that maximize their profits. A recent development in the modeling of vertical mergers is to assume 
bargaining between firms at the two stages and, more specifically, to use the Nash bargaining solution to model 
prices. See Rogerson (2020). In general, a vertical merger reduces the cost to the vertically integrated firm of 
having negotiations break down. As a result, it increases the minimum price the seller of an intermediate good 
would accept (and reduces the maximum price a buyer would be willing to pay). Since price of an intermediate 
good in the Nash bargaining solution is a weighted   average of the minimum price a seller would accept and the 
price that maximizes its profits, this effect pushes in the direction of predicting a price increase from a vertical 
merger. The result about how a merger affects the minimum price a seller will accept is robust, but the Nash 
bargaining solution is, despite its widespread use, is an ad hoc solution to an otherwise intractable problem. (It is 
hard to reconcile why economists accept the Nash bargaining solution but dismiss conjectural variations.) 
Demonstrating that the pre-merger price of an input is below the minimum the vertically integrated firm would 
accept would constitute a compelling case that a vertical merger will result in RRC. While the Agencies have 
increasingly relied on models of bargaining to evaluate mergers in which bargaining is a key feature of the 
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(1) 𝑞𝑖 =  𝑏𝑖0 −  𝑏𝑖𝑖  𝑝𝑖 +  𝑏𝑖𝑗 𝑝𝑗              𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ (1,2), 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 
where qi and pi are the price and quantity of good i. Let wi be the upstream price of good i and assume 
that both prices exceed marginal cost, which we can assume to be 0.  
The monopolist’s profit-maximizing prices are:25 
(2) 𝑝𝑖 =  𝑏𝑖0 −  
[2𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑗𝑗− 𝑏𝑖𝑗(𝑏𝑖𝑗+ 𝑏𝑗𝑖)](𝑏𝑖0−𝑤𝑖)+𝑏𝑖𝑖(𝑏𝑖𝑗− 𝑏𝑗𝑖)(𝑏𝑗0− 𝑤𝑗)
4𝑏11𝑏22−(𝑏𝑖𝑗 + 𝑏𝑗𝑖)
2           𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ (1,2), 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 
If the downstream monopolist merges with, say, upstream firm 1, it gets good 1 at marginal 
cost. As a result, the effect of the merger on the static pricing incentives depends on how a reduction in 
w1 affects p1 and p2. Intuitively, it might seem that such a merger would provide an incentive to lower p1 
and raise p2, and that is one of the qualitative possibilities. But there are two others. One, which is an 
application of what is known as “Edgeworth’s Paradox of Taxation,”26 is that the merger provides an 
incentive to raise both prices. This possibility implies that the static pricing effects of EDM do not 
necessarily benefit consumers. But the other possibility is that the merger provides an incentive to lower 
both prices, so RRC is not an inevitable result of a vertical merger either.  
One might hypothesize that the two less intuitive qualitative results are mere theoretical 
curiosities – similar to Giffen goods - and that there should be a strong presumption that pricing 
incentives created by a vertical merger fall into the intermediate case of a reduction in the price of the 
product the monopolist now produces and an increase in the product that competes with it. But, in 
equation (2), when 𝑏12 =  𝑏21, the downstream price of good 2 does not depend on the upstream price 
of good 1.27 If the income effects from price changes of the two goods are negligible, then the cross-
 
competitive environment, the assumption that companies set prices to maximize their profits is the more standard 
assumption. For a discussion of the use of bargaining models by the Agencies, see Nevo (2014). 
25 See Salinger (1991) 552.  
26 See Edgeworth (1925). Edgeworth first published the result in Italian in 1897. The reference here is to the English 
translation. 
27 This is even assuming that the producer of Good 2 keeps w2 constant. The reduction in the downstream price of 
Good 1 would give the producer of Good 2 an incentive to reduce w2, which would then result in a reduction in p2 
given linear demand and equal cross-price effects. 
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price slopes of the Marshallian demands are also the cross-price effects of the compensated demand 
curves; and the equality of the cross effects is the Slutsky-Hicks condition needed for the demand 
system to imply an underlying utility function. Symmetry of cross-price effects is a much weaker 
condition than completely symmetric demand. 
Demand curves do not have to be linear; and, even if all individual demand curves obey the 
Slutsky-Hicks condition, the market demand curves derived from aggregating them need not do so.28 But 
there is nothing perverse about linear demand curves, and the Slutsky-Hicks conditions are a natural 
base case even if they do not have to hold literally. If b21 < b12, then EDM with respect to Good 1 does 
provide the merging firm an incentive to raise p2. But, in that case, a merger of the downstream 
monopolist with the supplier of Good 2 would provide an incentive to lower p1 (as well as p2).  
The above analysis does not explicitly model the upstream equilibrium prior to the merger or 
how a vertical merger affects the pricing incentives of the remaining upstream firm. Assuming that the 
two upstream goods are strategic complements, however, a vertical merger would provide an incentive 
for the upstream competitor of the merged firm to reduce its price, which would in turn provide an 
additional incentive to the downstream monopolist to lower prices to final consumers. 
 
28 Harold Hotelling presents a set of quadratic demand curves that satisfy the Slutsky-Hicks conditions and in which 
Edgeworth’s Paradox arises for a tax on one of the goods. (A tax on the other good causes an increase in the price 
of both goods.) See Hotelling (1932), p. 612. Of course, the conditions underlying Edgeworth’s Paradox are not 
necessary for a vertical merger to result in net consumer harm or some price increases. Indeed, the literature does 
contain some documented increases in prices resulting from vertical mergers. Gilbert and Hastings (2005) find that 
the 1997 merger of Tosco and Unocal caused an increase in the price of wholesale gasoline (but did not study the 
effect on retail prices, which is what would be needed for a showing of consumer harm). Luco and Marshall (2020) 
find that The Coca-Cola Company’s acquisition of Coca-Cola Enterprises (CCE), its largest U.S. bottler, caused a 
reduction in the prices of Coca-Cola products but an increase in the prices of the other brands (such as Dr. Pepper 
and Canada Dry Ginger Ale) that CCE bottled and distributed. Given that the volume of Coca-Cola products bottled 
by CCE far exceeded the volume of other brands, the net effect on consumer surplus was likely positive. In 
addition, whatever RRC effect may have resulted from that merger, it should be viewed in light of the long history 
of the complicated vertical relationship between soft drink concentrate producers and their bottlers. While there 
have been long-standing concerns about the effect of vertical integration between Coca-Cola and Pepsi with their 
bottlers, the historical evidence suggests that the vertical integration they chose has benefited consumers. See 
Salinger (2014). [Disclosure: I was a consultant to CCE with respect to the FTC’s pre-merger review.]   
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The model of a vertical merger between an upstream monopolist and one of two competing 
downstream firms yields similar conclusions.29 With symmetric cross-price effects, a vertical merger 
results in a reduction in all prices – not only the two downstream prices but also the price the merged 
firm charges its downstream competitor. That is, RRC does not occur. When the stages are modeled as 
complementary, a complementary-goods merger does give the merged firm an incentive to charge more 
for the component to be used in conjunction with its competitor’s product, but the combined prices that 
purchasers of the competitor’s product pay for the two components drop.  
III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
A.  Interpreting the Economic Theory of the Effect of Vertical Mergers 
 
Some economists have argued that there is no basis in economic theory for a presumption that 
vertical mergers in concentrated markets pose less of a threat to competition than do horizontal 
mergers, and that the potential anticompetitive effect from a vertical merger is in effect the same as in a 
horizontal merger.30 Simple economic models belie such assertions.  
 In the above model, a horizontal merger of the competing duopolists would provide static 
pricing incentives to increase prices. That qualitative result is not sensitive to the assumptions about the 
functional form of demand, the specific parameters of the demand relationship, or the precise 
oligopolistic interaction between the two firms. In the same model, a vertical merger results in price 
decreases for both goods and no RRC.   
The duopoly-monopoly structure (regardless of which if either stage is “upstream”) is not simply 
one of many possible sets of modeling assumptions to make in assessing what economic theory predicts 
 
29 See Salinger (2021). See also Lu, Moresi, and Salop (2007), Akgün et al. (2020), Domnenko and Sibley (2020) and 
Das Varma and Gupta (2020).  
30 See Salop (2018) (slide 16), Baker, Rose, Salop, and Scott Morton (2019) (p. 13), and Moresi and Salop (2020) (p. 
1).  
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about the likely effects of vertical mergers on static pricing incentives. It is the natural extension of the 
Bertrand model with differentiated products to consider markets with multiple stages of production, 
and it is the natural extension of the successive/complementary merger model to consider the 
possibility of RRC effects.31 If this set of assumptions yielded the robust result that vertical mergers in 
concentrated markets result in price increases, that result would provide the economic logic for 
competition agencies to treat vertical mergers similarly to horizontal mergers. But those assumptions 
yield no such result. And, if economists would consider such results to be relevant if those models 
predicted price increases, then they must consider them equally relevant if, as is the case, they do not.  
Economically sound antitrust policy must recognize not only the power of economic analysis but 
also its limits. Economics is not a precise science. If the Agencies are going to base vertical merger 
enforcement on their models of how a vertical merger will affect static pricing incentives, then one of 
two things must be the case. One possibility is that predicted price increases are a robust feature of the 
underlying models (so that at least the qualitative predictions are not particularly sensitive to model 
details). If they are not, as is the case with vertical mergers, the second possibility is that the available 
tools for ascertaining the underlying structure of the model and for measuring model parameters are 
precise and reliable enough to determine whether a particular merger is likely to be anticompetitive.  
In the model in Section II, the combination of linear demand and symmetric cross-price effects 
implies that a vertical merger between the monopolist and either upstream firm would result in price 
decreases. As a result, for a model to predict price increases from a vertical merger, it would have to 
entail either asymmetric cross-price effects or non-linearities in demand; and these features would have 
 
31 A major shortcoming of the Church paper prepared for the European Commission was that it did not discuss the 
results of the monopoly-duopoly model at all, much less focus on it as a central model to consider. Instead, his 
policy recommendations focused on verifying what seemed to be key assumptions underlying the various post-
Chicago models of potential harm from vertical mergers. Perhaps because of the variety of assumptions underlying 
the different models of potential harm from vertical mergers, there is no obvious consensus among industrial 
economists as to what constitutes the basic economics of vertical mergers. The absence of such a consensus 
increases the risk that policy makers will simply ignore the input of economists.  
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to be results, not assumptions.32 This is problematic for two reasons. First, it would seem to be rare that 
it will be possible to measure the demand relationships sufficiently precisely to conclude with the 
degree of confidence that the Agencies must demonstrate in court that price increases are likely. 
Second, even if the measurement tools were available, a policy in which the legality of a vertical merger 
turns on the relative size of cross-price effects or non-linearities in demand is not sufficiently 
transparent to businesses or to courts.33  
B.  Vertical Upward Pricing Pressure 
 
One of the (relatively) recent developments in the review of horizontal mergers is the use of 
“Upward Pricing Pressure” (“UPP”).34 The insight behind UPP is that the effect of a horizontal merger 
between Firm A and Firm B on static pricing incentives is to add a marginal opportunity cost to the first 
order condition with respect to each price. More specifically, that opportunity cost in the first order 
condition for the price of Good A equals the diversion ratio from Good B to Good A multiplied by the 
price-cost margin on Good B. 
 
32 The assumption of logit demand in a model of vertical market structure tends to predict price increases more 
than does linear demand. But the frequent use of logit demand in merger analysis is because it is possible to 
calibrate logit demand without econometric estimation of cross-price effects and not because of any theoretical or 
empirical result that the functional form for actual demand curves is logit. The fact that logit demand is non-linear 
does not imply that in a model of vertical mergers, non-liinearity (or even convexity) implies price increases from 
vertical mergers. See Salinger (2021).   
33 Because merger enforcement is inherently an exercise in decision theory, it rests either explicitly or implicitly on 
prior probabilities (that can be conditioned on observable criteria such as market concentration) about whether 
vertical mergers are likely to be anticompetitive. Several reviews of the empirical literature conclude that the 
evidence supports a presumption that vertical mergers benefit consumers. See Cooper, Froeb, O’Brien and Vita 
(2005), Lafontaine and Slade (2007),and Blair, Wilson, Sokol, Klovers, and Sandford (2020). In this issue, Beck and 
Scott-Morton also review the empirical literature and question the conclusions from these earlier studies. As they 
point out, the published literature is not a representative sample. A big problem is that, representative or not, the 
sample is very small. The effect of vertical mergers and integration is easier to study in some industries (multi-
channel video distribution and soft drinks, to name two) than in others; and what scholars find interesting biases 
both what scholars study and what referees and editors accept. Thus, absent objective empirical probabilities, the 
prior probabilities that inform policy are necessarily subjective.   
34 See Farrell and Shapiro (2010).  
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UPP is short-cut relative to complete merger simulation. The shift in a first order condition is 
one element of a horizontal merger simulation, but UPP leaves out the simultaneous solution of the 
multiple first-order conditions for the merged firm as well as any reactions by other competitors and the 
effect of those reactions on the post-merger equilibrium. There are two key rationales for relying on 
UPP, and they both have to hold for UPP to be a useful tool in the review of horizontal mergers. First, 
the other elements of full merger simulation must be difficult to measure;35 and, second, the qualitative 
results (and, ideally, the approximate quantitative results) of a full merger simulation must not be 
sensitive to those additional details.    
Moresi and Salop have observed that vertical mergers create a similar effect on the first order 
conditions with respect to prices.36 Suppose Firm U is an upstream monopolist supplier of an input to 
both firms. If A and U merge and one compares the pre- and post-merger first order conditions with 
respect to the price of Good A, the latter contains an additional term equal to the diversion ratio from B 
to A multiplied by the merged firm’s margin on the upstream good. From this, Moresi and Salop argue 
that the distinction that many economists draw between horizontal and vertical mergers is artificial.  
Despite the similarity between horizontal and vertical upward pricing pressure, the rationale for 
relying on UPP in the evaluation of horizontal mergers does not apply to vertical mergers. To be sure, 
the first of the necessary conditions does apply. The additional details needed for full merger simulation 
are difficult to measure. But both of the necessary conditions are indeed necessary, and the second 
condition does not apply. The qualitative results of a vertical merger simulation do depend on the 
additional details. 
Not only is a measure of vertical upward pricing pressure not a useful tool in the evaluation of 
vertical mergers, but the rationale for using UPP in horizontal mergers is why basing vertical merger 
 
35 If they were not, there would be no reason to rely on the shortcut. 
36 See Moresi and Salop (2013).  
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enforcement on an assessment of static pricing incentives is misguided. Because the crucial details 
needed to predict the qualitative effect of a vertical merger on static pricing incentives are difficult to 
measure, the Agencies are unlikely to be able to demonstrate convincingly that a vertical merger will 
give rise to an incentive to raise prices.37  
C.  Structural Analysis 
 
The 1968 Merger Guidelines laid out structural criteria based on concentration ratios and the 
market shares of the merging parties for both horizontal and vertical mergers. Remarkably, the 
structural conditions that they laid out for challenging vertical mergers were nearly as restrictive as 
those for challenging horizontal mergers.38  
Even though the cross-sectional structure performance studies of the 1950’s and 1960’s fell out 
of favor among academic economists, structural analysis continues to play a role in horizontal merger 
enforcement. Even the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines state structural criteria that affect the 
likelihood that the Agencies will challenge a horizontal merger.39 Data that the FTC publishes about its 
merger review confirm that structural criteria are strong predictors of agency actions.40 US case law 
entails a “structural presumption” that mergers of firms with significant market shares in highly 
concentrated markets are anticompetitive. A reliance on structural criteria in merger enforcement has 
persisted because it makes merger policy more transparent to businesses, antitrust counsel, and courts. 
Economic theory provides support for the proposition that the static pricing incentives created 
by horizontal mergers of firms with significant market shares is to increase prices, and that theory is part 
of the justification for the role of market structure in horizontal merger enforcement. There is no such 
economic theory to support a structural presumption for vertical mergers based on static pricing 
 
37 Domenko and Sibley also make this point. See Domenko and Sibley (2019).  
38 See Department of Justice (1968), ¶12-13. 
39 See Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission (2010), §5.3.  
40 See Federal Trade Commission (2013). 
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incentives. Even when there is duopoly at one stage and monopoly at the other, economic theory simply 
does not predict that the static pricing incentives created by a vertical merger are necessarily to increase 
any price, much less to result in a reduction in consumer surplus. 
One might hypothesize that even if there can be no general structural presumption in the 
duopoly-monopoly case, there might be one based on the market share of the firm at the duopoly stage. 
For example, one might imagine a structural presumption if a dominant firm at one stage seeks to 
merge with a firm with at least a 60% share at an adjacent stage. But economic theory provides no 
foundation for such a rule either. Asymmetry in market shares does not imply the asymmetry in cross-
price effects that would be needed with linear demands to generate predictions of price increases from 
a vertical. Moreover, suppose that the legality of a vertical merger in the monopoly-duopoly setting 
turned on the share of the firm in the duopoly. It is not clear that it would be the merger with the bigger 
firm that would be objectionable. As the share of the larger firm approaches 100%, the industry would 
approach successive monopoly; and a model of the static pricing incentives created by a vertical merger 
would predict price reductions. And, suppose that with duopoly shares of 75% and 25%, economic 
theory predicted price increases from a merger between the monopolist and the smaller firm and price 
decreases from a merger between the monopolist and the larger firm. Would anyone other than 
professional economists endorse an antitrust rule that would permit the monopolist at one stage to 
purchase a large firm at an adjacent stage but not a smaller one? 
This latter point about the need for antitrust enforcement to conform with common sense is not 
limited to structural presumptions. It applies equally to more complicated, less transparent approaches 
to enforcement. If the methodologies that the Agencies use to analyze vertical mergers would lead to 
clearance of a merger between a monopolist and a firm at an adjacent stage with a 75% share but would 
not permit the same monopolist to merger with the smaller firm at the adjacent stage, the underlying 
policy is equally problematic. Whatever approach or approaches the Agencies plan to use – and the 
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VMG do not make clear what they are – I am not aware of any analysis of the structural conditions that 
would be most prone to a challenge. 
IV. POTENTIAL COMPETITION AS ECONOMICALLY SOUND BASIS FOR VERTICAL 
MERGER ENFORCEMENT 
 
In arguing that the theory of how vertical mergers affect static pricing incentives does not 
suggest any basis for a structural presumption, I am not arguing that there can be no basis for a 
structural presumption with respect to vertical mergers. Rather, my point is that the logical foundation 
of such a structural presumption cannot be static pricing incentives.41  
Another possible basis for a structural presumption is the threat of entry (or sponsorship of 
entry). One of the challenges the Agencies have in justifying merger challenges based on potential entry 
is that a merger only reduces the competitive effect of potential entry if one of the parties is the most 
likely or one of a small number of likely entrants into the other’s markets. This can be difficult to prove 
as it is often difficult to identify likely entrants. In cases of successive dominance, however, economics 
suggest that the dominant firm at each stage has the greatest incentive to enter or sponsor entry at the 
adjacent stage.  
In cases of successive dominance, the theory that the firm at each stage has a unique incentive 
to enter or sponsor entry at the adjacent stage is robust theory. As long as entry at one stage lowers 
prices at that stage, the other stage becomes more profitable. This is the case even if the margins at the 
two stages do not result in a price that exceeds the joint profit-maximizing price.42  
 
41 An exception is “diagonal mergers,” which occur when a firm merges with a firm from which it does not 
purchase inputs but which does supply inputs to its competitors. An example is AT&T’s purchase of McCaw in 
1994. McCaw was a cellular phone carrier and AT&T was an equipment provider. McCaw did not purchase AT&T 
equipment, but its competitors did. Because McCaw did not use AT&T equipment, the merger did not eliminate 
double marginalization, but it did create an RRC incentive that the Department of Justice sought to eliminate with 
a consent decree. See Department of Justice (1994). 
42 In principle, successively dominant firms or firms with complementary monopolies might be able to coordinate 
their pricing to charge the joint profit-maximizing prices (just as oligopolists in principle might be able to 
coordinate – either through explicit collusion or tacit coordination – to maximize their joint profits). Of course, 
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An example of a vertical merger that should have been (and was) challenged on potential 
competition grounds was Time-Warner’s 1996 purchase of Turner Broadcasting. Time-Warner’s cable 
systems were dominant distributors in their service territories and CNN was the dominant cable news 
network. At the time, MS-NBC and Fox News threatened CNN’s dominance. Without the merger, Time 
Warner would have benefited from extra competition in cable news. The merger with Turner gave it an 
incentive to block the new entrants.43  
Another example of vertical merger that should have been (and was) challenged on potential 
competition grounds was TicketMaster’s 2010 purchase of LiveNation. Ticketmaster was (and remains) 
the dominant provider of ticketing services for concerts and LiveNation was the largest promoter of 
concerts. LiveNation was not only a potential entant into ticketing, it had already started entering.44 
Both of these cases were settled with consent agreements. One might question whether the 
consents provided adequate relief and, if not, whether the mergers should have been blocked rather 
than cleared with conditions. But the focus of the VMGs is on what vertical mergers the Agencies are 
likely to challenge, not on the appropriate remedies. The VMGs do cite potential competition as a 
possible theory for blocking a vertical merger, but the emphasis that theory receives in these guidelines 
is less than it receives in the 1984 Merger Guidelines.  
 
even if vertically situated firms manage to restrain their prices below the single-period Nash equilibrium prices, 
they would not necessarily achieve joint profit-maximization; and, if they do temporarily achieve joint profit-
maximization, they would both have an incentive to raise prices. If they are truly dominant, there is no reason to 
expect them to reduce prices below those that maximize joint profits.  
43 The FTC issued a complaint about the merger and entered into a consent with Time-Warner as condition for 
clearing it. The conditions included a requirement for Time-Warner to carry at least one additional cable news 
channel on its cable systems. See Federal Trade Commission (1996). 
44 See Department of Justice (2010).  
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V. CONCLUSIONS – A KEY QUESTION TO ANSWER 
If the VMG provide clarity to businesses, antitrust practitioners, and courts, one should be able 
to answer the following question: Name two companies that, based on the VMG, cannot engage in a 
vertical merger and what is the economic principle underlying why?  
In the case of horizontal mergers, answering this question is simple. The Coca-Cola Company 
and PepsiCo cannot merge. Apple and Microsoft cannot merge. Neither can Apple and Google. Probably 
(although given past U.S. agency enforcement with respect to airlines, it is less clear), Delta Airlines and 
United Airlines cannot merge. The underlying economic principle is the prisoner’s dilemma applied to 
actions by competing firms. When one firm takes actions such as a price cut or product improvement to 
increase its sales, it generally takes business from its competitors. When a sufficiently large fraction of 
the increased sales would be diverted from the proposed merger partner, then the merger dulls the 
incentive to behave competitively. The ability to predict how the Agencies will respond to a horizontal 
merger is not limited to mergers to monopoly. “Three-to-twos”45 are likely to be challenged. “Seven-to-
sixes” are usually legal.   
One can answer the question based on the section on vertical mergers from the DOJ 1984 
Merger Guidelines. Whether or not the requisite structural conditions are still present, there was a time 
when Microsoft’s position in personal computer operating systems and productivity software and Intel’s 
position in microprocessors for personal computers were dominant to the point of nearly being 
monopolies. A merger between them likely would have resulted in EDM and, therefore, downward 
static pricing pressure. Yet, each had a strong incentive to promote entry in the other’s market. 
Microsoft had an incentive to see ADM, Intel’s main competitor, succeed; and Intel was a major sponsor 
of Linux, an open-source operating system that threatened Microsoft’s Windows. The rationale for 
 
45 These numbers do not literally refer to the total number of competitors but, rather, the number of significant 
competitors or, alternatively, HHI equivalents.  
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blocking such a merger would be potential competition, not static pricing incentives; and it is a challenge 
that one could predict based on the 1984 Merger Guidelines.  
Because the VMG include potential competition as a possible theory for blocking a vertical 
merger and because challenges based on static pricing incentives are going to be difficult to prove, the 
VMG are unlikely to have much of an effect on what mergers the Agencies successfully block. But by 
focusing on static pricing incentives rather than potential competition, they muddy the waters rather 
than clarifying them. 
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